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On February 16, 2017, the Ministry of Health in Zamfara 
State, in northwestern Nigeria, notified the Nigeria Centre for 
Disease Control (NCDC) of an increased number of suspected 
cerebrospinal meningitis (meningitis) cases reported from 
four local government areas (LGAs). Meningitis cases were 
subsequently also reported from Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, and 
Sokoto states, all of which share borders with Zamfara State, 
and from Yobe State in northeastern Nigeria. On April 3, 
2017, NCDC activated an Emergency Operations Center 
(EOC) to coordinate rapid development and implementa-
tion of a national meningitis emergency outbreak response 
plan. After the outbreak was reported, surveillance activities 
for meningitis cases were enhanced, including retrospective 
searches for previously unreported cases, implementation of 
intensified new case finding, and strengthened laboratory 
confirmation. A total of 14,518 suspected meningitis cases 
were reported for the period December 13, 2016–June 15, 
2017. Among 1,339 cases with laboratory testing, 433 (32%) 
were positive for bacterial pathogens, including 358 (82.7%) 
confirmed cases of Neisseria meningitidis serogroup C. In 
response, approximately 2.1 million persons aged 2–29 years 
were vaccinated with meningococcal serogroup C–containing 
vaccines in Katsina, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara states during 
April–May 2017. The outbreak was declared over on June 15, 
2017, after high-quality surveillance yielded no evidence of 
outbreak-linked cases for 2 consecutive weeks. Routine high-
quality surveillance, including a strong laboratory system to test 
specimens from persons with suspected meningitis, is critical 
to rapidly detect and confirm future outbreaks and inform 
decisions regarding response vaccination.
Background
All northern Nigeria states lie within the sub-Saharan 
“Meningitis Belt,” a region of 26 countries that experiences the 
largest burden of meningococcal disease, with annual epidemics 
reported during the December–June dry season. Meningitis 
causes severe illness, and if not detected and treated quickly, 
could lead to permanent disability that puts a significant burden 
on families. In many settings, approximately 10% of meningitis 
cases ultimately result in death. Before introduction of the 
meningococcal serogroup A conjugate vaccine (MenAfriVac) in 
2013 (1), Nigeria experienced some of the largest epidemics of 
meningococcal meningitis, including the 1996 N. meningitidis 
serogroup A (NmA) epidemic that resulted in 109,580 
suspected cases and 11,717 reported deaths (2). In 2013, a 
new strain of N. meningitidis serogroup C (NmC) emerged in 
Nigeria, resulting in small focal outbreaks during 2014–2016 
(3,4). In 2015, this strain of NmC entered neighboring Niger, 
resulting in the largest ever global epidemic of serogroup C 
meningitis (5), until the 2016–2017 Nigeria epidemic described 
in this report. Molecular sequencing of bacterial isolates from 
patients in the region has confirmed the expansion of this new 
strain of serogroup C in five countries in the region (Ryan 
Novak, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory 
Diseases, CDC, personal communication, 2017).
Case Definition and Incidence Thresholds 
for Response
A suspected case of meningitis was defined as the sudden 
onset of fever (>100.4°F [>38.0°C]) and at least one menin-
geal sign, including neck stiffness or altered consciousness in 
any person, or a bulging anterior fontanelle in children aged 
<18 months (6). Available cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) or blood 
specimens from patients meeting the suspected meningitis 
case definition were transported to a designated laboratory for 
confirmation by culture, latex agglutination, or real-time–poly-
merase chain reaction (PCR) tests. World Health Organization 
(WHO) Meningitis Outbreak Response Guidelines were 
used to identify geographic areas at risk for epidemics to 
guide response (6). Attack rates of suspected meningitis cases 
reported weekly by LGAs were calculated. WHO recommends 
that a set of preparedness activities be implemented when the 
attack rate of suspected meningitis in an LGA crosses a defined 
“Alert” threshold, and additional response activities at a defined 
“Epidemic” threshold (Table 1).
Outbreak Investigation
Two outbreak investigation teams were deployed to Zamfara 
and Sokoto states to augment routine surveillance, forward 
available CSF specimens to a designated laboratory for analysis, 
verify the extent of the outbreak, and gather specific informa-
tion regarding the affected population to guide response. The 
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TABLE 1. Guidelines for incidence thresholds and interventions for detection and control of epidemic meningococcal meningitis based on 
population size of the local government area in countries in Africa with endemic disease* — World Health Organization
Incidence 
threshold
Population size
Interventions<30,000 30,000–100,000
Alert Two suspected cases in 1 week or increase in 
incidence compared with nonepidemic years
Three suspected cases per 100,000 population 
per week (two or more cases in 1 week)
1) Inform authorities, 2) strengthen surveillance, 
3) investigate, 4) confirm (including laboratory), 
5) treat cases, 6) prepare for eventual response
Epidemic Five suspected cases in 1 week† or doubling of 
number of cases in a 3-week period
10 suspected cases per 100,000 population 
per week
1) Conduct mass vaccination§ within 4 weeks of 
crossing epidemic threshold, 2) distribute 
treatment to health centers, 3) treat according 
to epidemic protocol, 4) inform the public
* Guidelines adapted from http://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/144727.
† In special situations such as mass gatherings, refugees, displaced persons or closed institutions, two confirmed cases in a week should prompt mass vaccination.
§ If an area neighboring one targeted for vaccination is considered to be at risk (e.g., cases early in the dry season, no recent relevant vaccination campaign, or high 
population density), it should be included in a vaccination program.
first meningitis cases, a 21-case cluster in a village in Zurmi 
LGA of Zamfara State, were reported to the State Ministry 
of Health in December 2016; however, the cluster was not 
reported to NCDC until February 2017, after the outbreak 
had spread to four other LGAs in Zamfara, and to Katsina, 
Kebbi, Niger, and Sokoto states. During December 2016–June 
2017, among Nigeria’s 37 state-level jurisdictions, 26 (70%) 
reported suspected meningitis cases, with peak incidence dur-
ing reporting week 15 (April 16–22, 2017) (Figure). Meningitis 
incidence in 56 LGAs met the alert threshold and in 38 met 
the epidemic threshold. Overall, 14,518 suspected cases and 
1,166 deaths (case-fatality ratio = 8.0%), were reported during 
the outbreak; 7,140 (49%) cases were reported from Zamfara 
State, and 6,792 (47%) occurred in children aged 5–14 years 
(Table 2). Confirmatory laboratory testing was conducted for 
specimens from 1,339 (9%) suspected meningitis patients; 
among these, 433 (32.3%) were laboratory-confirmed as bacte-
rial meningitis, including 358 (82.7%) with NmC (Table 2).
Early Outbreak Response Activities
Following initial investigations, including health facility 
register reviews and analysis of community informant reports, 
NCDC activated the meningitis EOC on April 3, 2017 to 
coordinate outbreak response strategies and operations across 
the entire country in collaboration with country partner agen-
cies, including WHO, CDC, the Africa Centre for Disease 
Control and Prevention, the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and the Africa Field Epidemiology Network. To 
ensure that suspected meningitis cases were rapidly detected 
and investigated, meningitis surveillance, according to 
WHO’s Africa Region Guidelines for Enhanced Meningitis 
Surveillance, was strengthened in all states, regardless of 
whether states reported cases. EOCs were also activated to 
coordinate outbreak response activities in Sokoto and Zamfara 
states, the two states at the epicenter of the outbreak. Rapid 
response teams of epidemiologists and clinicians were deployed 
from the national EOC to support states with at least one LGA 
meeting the defined outbreak threshold.
Early outbreak response activities were hampered by dif-
ficulty in accessing some of the more rural and remote com-
munities experiencing the outbreak. A limited capacity for CSF 
specimen collection among health care workers, deficiencies in 
the laboratory systems, including a lack of basic test kits and 
limited resources to support timely and appropriate specimen 
transportation from health facilities to a laboratory with PCR 
or culture capacity, contributed to delayed case identification. 
Additionally, the human resources needed to support effective 
outbreak detection and response were limited in some of the 
states with the largest case numbers, necessitating the recruit-
ment and deployment of a large contingent of ad hoc technical 
support personnel from the national level to support outbreak 
control activities in these states.
Outbreak Response Vaccination
The National Primary Health Care Development Agency, 
responsible for vaccination activities in Nigeria, received menin-
gococcal C–containing vaccines through the International 
Coordinating Group on Vaccine Provision in April 2017, 
2 months after the outbreak was first widely reported. Because 
of limited vaccine supplies, vaccine use was prioritized to the 
most affected LGAs in Katsina, Sokoto, Yobe, and Zamfara 
states (6) where approximately 2.1 million (84.4%) of an 
estimated 2.5 million persons at risk (based on the WHO 
guidelines) aged 2–29 years were vaccinated. Extensive social 
mobilization activities, including outreach to community lead-
ers and engagement on social and traditional media helped raise 
awareness and facilitate desired behavior change, including 
vaccine acceptance and avoidance of overcrowding, thereby 
reducing potential for continued transmission.
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FIGURE. Weekly number of suspected meningitis cases — Nigeria, December 2016–June 2017*
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* Reporting week 15 corresponds to April 16–22, 2017; week 21 corresponds to June 4–10, 2017.
Discussion
The outbreak likely represents the largest global outbreak of 
NmC. Response measures implemented during the outbreak, 
including improved case finding and management as well as 
mass vaccination campaigns, might have contributed to the 
outbreak control. However, the large number of cases and 
prolonged duration of the outbreak highlight key lessons for 
meningitis outbreak prevention, detection, and response in 
Nigeria and other countries in the meningitis belt. Timely and 
appropriate use of meningococcal vaccines is effective in pre-
venting and limiting the spread of meningococcal meningitis 
outbreaks. The introduction of the meningococcal A conjugate 
vaccine against NmA in Nigeria and other countries in the 
meningitis belt represents a major milestone in meningitis 
outbreak control and has contributed to significant reductions 
in NmA infections (7,8). However, laboratory data from this 
and other recent outbreaks point to the evolving regional men-
ingitis epidemiology with increasing proportions of epidem-
ics attributable to bacterial meningitis pathogens other than 
NmA, for which meningococcal A conjugate vaccine provides 
no protection (3,4). These findings suggest an urgent need to 
expand availability of multivalent vaccines that are effective 
against non-A serogroups.
In Nigeria, meningitis is classified as an epidemic-prone 
disease, requiring immediate notification, investigation, and 
necessary action (9); significant lapses in reporting in the early 
stages of this outbreak (from December 2016 to February 
2017) might have contributed to its large size and wide reach. 
Additionally, limited capacity for CSF specimen collection, a 
lack of test kits, and inadequate resources to support timely 
and appropriate specimen transportation from health facilities 
to a laboratory with PCR or culture capacity contributed to 
the low percentage of confirmed meningitis cases. Similarly, 
delays in case finding, reporting and investigation, especially 
in the more remote areas, limited timely outbreak response. 
These meningitis surveillance system weaknesses merit further 
investigation, with remediating action implemented to prevent 
future reoccurrence. Because delayed access to meningococcal 
vaccines might have contributed to the prolonged outbreak 
duration, a careful examination of country vaccine requisition 
processes, and International Coordinating Group on Vaccine 
Provision protocols for vaccine requests, approval, delivery 
and use, is needed.
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TABLE 2. Characteristics of patients in 14,518 suspected cerebrospinal 
meningitis cases — Nigeria, December 2016–June 2017
Characteristic No. (%)
Sex
Male 7,802 (53.7)
Female 6,699 (46.2)
Missing/Unknown 17 (0.1)
Age group (yrs)
<1 219 (1.5)
1–4 1,796 (12.4)
5–14 6,792 (46.8)
≥15 5,667 (39.1)
Missing/Unknown 44 (0.3)
State
Zamfara 7,140 (49.2)
Sokoto 4,980 (34.3)
Katsina 915 (6.3)
Yobe 415 (2.9)
Kebbi 142 (1.0)
Niger 131 (0.9)
Other 795 (5.5)
Meningococcal serogroup or other identified organism*,†
A 27 (6.2)
B 1 (0.2)
C 358 (82.7)
W 1 (0.2)
X§ —
Y 0 (0)
Unknown 32 (7.4)
Haemophilus influenzae (type b) 5 (1.2)
Streptococcus pneumoniae 9 (2.1)
* Total number of laboratory specimens tested = 1,339; 433 specimens yielded 
meningococcal or nonmeningococcal organisms. A total of 129 test results 
were invalid or missing, and the rest were classified as negative for any 
organisms tested.
† Cases confirmed by any of the following tests: latex agglutination, polymerase 
chain reaction, or culture.
§ Laboratory tests not available to detect Neisseria meningitidis serogroup X.
A surveillance and outbreak response system is most effective 
when the capacity to prevent, detect, and appropriately respond 
to outbreaks is available (10). In Nigeria, the human resource 
capacity to support an effective outbreak response varied widely 
within and between states, and was severely limited in some 
of the most at-risk states and LGAs. In low human resource 
capacity settings, evolving and refining new models for effec-
tive and timely outbreak detection and response, including 
scaling up emergency Rapid Response Team deployment 
where needed, is critical. In Nigeria, an opportunity exists for 
improved response coordination with lessons learned from 
EOCs established for coordination of polio eradication activi-
ties and response to Ebola virus disease, as well as leveraging 
trained personnel from the Nigeria Field Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Training Program. In the longer term, building 
adequate health care worker capacity at all national and subna-
tional surveillance system levels will be essential to a timely and 
effective outbreak response. Functional laboratory systems are 
pivotal to meningitis case confirmation and provide guidance 
for critical outbreak response activities, including decisions on 
appropriate vaccine use.
With the outbreak now declared over, efforts to improve 
surveillance and outbreak preparedness for meningitis need to 
continue. Recently concluded national and regional evaluations 
of the outbreak response have articulated recommendations for 
improving meningitis outbreak prevention, timely detection, 
and response in Nigeria, and implementation of these recom-
mendations is needed at all levels of the public health system. 
Additionally, conducting a review of the implementation of 
current meningitis outbreak alert and epidemic thresholds in 
Nigeria, including an assessment of sub-LGA–level sensitivity 
to outbreaks at the current thresholds could help to ensure 
optimal and timely detection at the lower levels. Developing 
and introducing conjugate vaccines effective against non-A 
meningococcal serogroups might help reduce the risk for 
future non-serogroup A meningococcal meningitis outbreaks.
Summary
What is already known about this topic?
Meningococcal disease caused by Neisseria meningitidis causes 
severe illness, and could lead to permanent disability or death if 
not quickly detected and treated. The largest global burden of 
meningococcal disease is in sub-Saharan Africa, where annual 
epidemics caused mainly by N. meningitidis serogroup A were 
previously common. After the introduction of meningococcal A 
vaccines in 2013, meningitis caused by serogroup A declined. 
However, N. meningitidis serogroup C (NmC) has now emerged 
as a cause of large outbreaks.
What is added by this report?
During December 2016–June 2017, the largest global epidemic 
of meningitis caused by NmC occurred in northern Nigeria, with 
14,518 suspected cases and 1,166 deaths reported. An 
emergency operations center coordinated rapid development 
and implementation of an emergency outbreak response plan, 
including administration of meningococcal serogroup C–
containing vaccines to >2 million persons. Multiple logistical 
challenges were encountered during the response; the 
outbreak was declared over in June 2017.
What are the implications for public health practice?
National and regional evaluations of the outbreak response have 
outlined recommendations for improving meningitis outbreak 
prevention, timely detection, and response in Nigeria. 
Implementation of these recommendations will be key to 
reducing future meningitis outbreaks. Expanding availability of 
multivalent vaccines that are effective against non-A serogroups 
of N. meningitidis might prevent future outbreaks in this region.
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